Under the shadow of silence: on speechless love in King Lear by Groarke, Steven
Running Head Right-hand: Under the shadow of silence 
Running Head Left-hand: Steven Groarke 
3 
Under the shadow of silence 
On speechless love in King Lear 
Steven Groarke 
I must admit that reading Steven Groarke’s chapter that follows has left me, 
well, speechless. Indeed, it is this – the emphasis on speechlessness – on 
silence that is, in so many ways, the very thrust of this paper – specifically 
Cordelia’s silence in Shakespeare’s King Lear which, as the author writes, 
“leaves ‘nothing’ (as it were) to speak for itself”. 
Groarke’s is certainly a complex and demanding paper, but then again so 
is the subject matter – Cordelia’s “broken speech of a love unutterable” 
which stands as silent/compassionate witness to her father’s suffering. Hers 
is a ‘gratuitous’ love in the most transcendent or religious sense of the word. 
Drawing on the significance of this gesture, the author lends new meaning to 
the original title of our book as he writes, “Together, witness and response 
remain a hard act to follow”. 
. . . love is not love 
Which alters when it alteration finds. 
Shakespeare, Sonnets, 116, ll. 2–3 
Cordelia is the hard act to follow in King Lear.1 Lear’s purgation stands in 
all its tumultuous magnificence as among Shakespeare’s greatest 
achievements. The redemptive force of the play, however, derives explicitly 
from the ordeal of Cordelia’s silent witness. We sense that Cordelia is in 
touch with something other than what we are able to make of her, precisely 
at the point where she falls silent. In developing and demonstrating this 
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claim, I shall focus on an underlying conflict of interpretation in 
Shakespearean criticism, a conflict that has far-reaching implications for our 
understanding of literature and its value. In particular, I propose to consider 
the conflict between psychological (Freudian) and poetical interpretations of 
Cordelia. The serious challenge that her character poses for the 
contemporary reader, subject under the conditions of modernity to a secular 
worldview, is directed first and foremost at her father, the aged and dying 
king. The challenge consists in weighing the various existential and ethical 
possibilities evoked by Cordelia’s silence. Lear expects to be loved, and he 
certainly doesn’t want to hear his favourite daughter telling him what she 
cannot say. In the event, silence stages a catastrophic misrecognition based 
on incommensurable understandings of love. Lear’s insistence on being 
fêted by devoted daughters, coupled with his youngest daughter’s refusal to 
play the pander for the old man, proves disastrous. 
The tragedy is of course open to different readings, even as Cordelia’s 
silence admits various meanings. There is no doubt about the ‘unhappy 
ending’. The tragic catastrophe at the heart of Shakespeare’s darkest play is 
ineradicable; further to the shattering of their bond by the old man’s folly, 
father and daughter are reunited only in death. Lear realises too late that he 
has failed to recognise his daughter’s love. But does this mean that the play 
is ultimately pessimistic? Love isn’t necessarily triumphant at the end of the 
play; but nor is it completely destroyed or ruined. On the contrary, it seems 
to me that Cordelia’s restrictive speech is a sign of unrestricted love, that her 
silent witness is continuous with her compassionate response to her father’s 
suffering. As such, her silence touches on the transcendent dimension in our 
ordinary capacity for love, indeed a love that begins in acts of kindness 
(Everett, 1989, p. 60). 
I present this affirmative reading of the play against the background of a 
central philosophical problem. Paul Ricoeur, in his magisterial Freud and 
Philosophy (1970), sought to identify two opposing directions in our reach 
for meaning. I am certainly not suggesting that ‘critical hermeneutics’ is a 
generally agreed definition of psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, my reading of 
Lear takes its bearings from Ricoeur’s (1970, p. 460, passim) account of the 
Freudian interpretation on the one hand and, on the other, restorative 
hermeneutics, understood as ‘a recollection of the sacred’. The important 
point is that these interpretative perspectives aren’t necessarily incompatible. 
An interpretation that attempts to ‘demystify religion’ may be seen as 
complementary to one that “tries to grasp, in the symbols of faith, a possible 
call or kerygma” (1970, p. 343). Together, critical and restorative 
hermeneutics provide a comprehensive understanding of the reach for 
meaning, including, our anticipation of the future (hope) as well as our sense 
of the past. 
To outline my argument, I begin by locating the general distinction 
between disenchanted and redemptive readings of Lear in terms of 
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Cordelia’s gratuitous love. I don’t intend to rehearse the long-standing 
debate about Lear and the reconciled life. Aside from the perennial wrangle 
concerning spiritualised interpretations of the play and its tragic hero, I 
contend that Cordelia’s speechless love evokes feelings of hope in a situation 
that is otherwise subject to despair. The identification of an excess 
(gratuitous love) beyond disaster sets the scene for a more detailed reading 
of the conflict of interpretations, starting with Freud and the idea of Cordelia 
as a figure of death. Freud saw reality as inherently tragic and, in his “The 
Theme of the Three Caskets” (1913), he advanced a reading of Lear along 
the lines of what we might call tragic, if not ruined love. 
A. C. Bradley, on the other hand, was the authoritative source throughout 
the first half of the twentieth century for the redemptive King Lear. Bradley, 
in his 1904 lectures Shakespearean Tragedy, comes to the conclusion that 
there is indeed “nothing more noble and beautiful in literature than 
Shakespeare’s exposition of the effect of suffering in reviving the greatness 
and eliciting the sweetness of Lear’s nature” (1905, p. 284). However, 
together with the Bradleyan approach to character, the redemptive reading 
remains fundamentally out of step with modern literary theory and the all-
pervasive scepticism of contemporary critical thought. I accept that the 
affirmative reading of the play as a journey on Lear’s part from power to 
love needs qualifying (Everett, 1989, p. 60). And yet while Lear himself 
doesn’t reach as far as Cordelia when it comes to an understanding of love, 
the tragedy is nonetheless replete with unyielding acts of kindness and their 
redemptive reach. I remain indebted to Bradley, then, for his understanding 
of the religious and moral dimensions of Shakespearean tragedy. 
1 
Shakespeare presents us with a portrait of various extremes in Lear. The old 
man wants to be told, as Rowan Williams (2016, p. 37) puts it, that “he is 
loved immeasurably beyond debt and duty, beyond the ordinary finite 
exchanges of ‘due’ affection and loyalty”. Cordelia also renders love 
excessive, but in an entirely different way to her father. In contrast to Lear’s 
self-destructiveness, the gratuitousness of her love, understood as a sign of 
the sacred, is the starting point for my reflections on Cordelia as a hard act to 
follow. Whereas the old man hankers after public displays of love and 
gratitude, Cordelia bears witness to a gratuitous love that is, I suggest, rooted 
in the affective archaism of the infant’s aggressive love coupled with a 
growing sense of concern. 
This is a necessarily personal starting point based on my own experience 
of the play. I have never come away from a performance of Lear over the 
past 40-odd years, or completed a reading of the text during this period, 
believing that Cordelia was no more than a corpse in the final scene. I have 
always felt that there is more at the end of the play, more to come, than the 
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blank pain of her death. Her reduction to “silence for ever” (Everett, 1989, 
p. 78) strikes me as a difficult, rather than a conclusive, proposition. Leaving 
aside the symptomatic reading of my own wishful thinking, like Williams 
(2016, p. 1), I found my first encounter with Lear at senior school 
“something of a watershed moment”. I remain particularly grateful to my 
English schoolmaster for this piece of good fortune; in fact, I don’t recall a 
comparable literary experience either before or since. And I agree with 
Williams that the play as a whole is shocking, precisely because it doesn’t 
promise consolation or a straightforward palliative vision. We are shocked 
by something other than sense issuing from the heart of the human situation. 
Cordelia’s profound and compelling silence has nonetheless continued to 
haunt me as a lesson of sorts. Instructive in its very severity, her silence 
seems to me to raise important questions about the role of the religious and 
moral imagination in Shakespearean tragedy. I don’t believe that Lear’s 
daughter keeps silent in order to teach her father something, nor that she 
undertakes to do without her father in a display of righteous arrogance – 
although I can see how these proposals would find favour in a culture 
excited by the twin enticements of iconoclasm and the ablation of parental 
authority. But Cordelia doesn’t scorn her father. She loves him unreservedly. 
At the same time, she undergoes an ordeal herself, an experience of 
speechlessness interior to the meaning and value of her character. 
In approaching the play, we find ourselves in much the same position as 
her father – that is, under pressure to make sense of her silence. What does 
she bring about by keeping silent? What does the silence make of her and of 
those around her? And to underline the religious aspect of Cordelia’s 
witness: does the silence admit the breath (spīritus) of her life even beyond 
the end? Anthony Nuttall (2007, p. 312), one of Shakespeare’s most astute 
readers, poses the problem at its most fundamental: Does Cordelia represent 
an ‘infinite sweetness’ beyond mundane comprehension? Note the critical 
transposition of the word ‘sweetness’ from Lear’s nature to Cordelia’s in the 
readings of Bradley and Nuttall, respectively. The overarching distinction 
between redemptive and disillusioned readings of the play comes to the fore 
with the evocation of nothingness in Cordelia’s silent witness. The 
distinction continues to guide readers, theatregoers and critics alike in their 
approach to the problem of tragic love. Broadly speaking, we find ourselves 
attempting to make sense of the love between Cordelia and her father from 
one or other of these two interpretative perspectives. 
2 
Disenchantment has become something of a modern dogma not only in the 
sociological tradition of Weber after Nietzsche; but more importantly, 
perhaps, in light of the Freudian interpretation. The mythological philosophy 
of Freudian thought rests on the conjunction of tragedy and reality. This is 
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evident in Freud’s recourse to the figure of ’Αυάγϰη (Necessity): “If we are 
to die ourselves . . . it is easier to submit to a remorseless law of nature, to 
the sublime ’Αυάγϰη, than to a chance which might perhaps have been 
escaped” (Freud, 1920, p. 45). The reformulation of the ‘reality principle’ 
(Freud, 1911) as a mythic figure of necessity provided Freud with a general 
vantage point from which to view the illusions of human narcissism. The 
excoriation of illusion is integral to the Freudian interpretation and, 
approaching Lear along these lines, Freud (1913, p. 299) interprets the 
tragedy with reference to the psychic mechanism of ‘wishful reversal’ or 
substitution. By concentrating on Lear’s love-test, his fateful whim to divide 
his inheritance among his three daughters, “in proportion to the amount of 
love that each of them expresses for him”, Freud (1913, p. 292) aims to 
understand the father’s choice as well as the third daughter’s identity. 
We are considerably advanced in our understanding by Freud’s findings 
regarding the psychological depths of the play. The choice between the three 
sisters, according to Freud (1913, p. 300), isn’t a choice at all, but a matter of 
necessity: “The free choice between the three sisters is, properly speaking, 
no free choice, for it must necessarily fall on the third if every kind of evil is 
not to come about, as it does in King Lear”. Here, as elsewhere, the Freudian 
interpretation is unflaggingly comprehensive: whenever the theme of the 
choice between three women occurs in literature, as it does with the three 
sisters in Lear, “the choice between the women is free, and yet it falls on 
death” (1913, p. 298). On this reading, Lear’s ill-fated choice reveals the 
degree to which his freedom was underwritten by necessity from the 
beginning. There was only one viable option open to him, which, with tragic 
consequences, he failed to realise. 
The Freudian interpretation underwrites a tragic ‘worldview’ that admits 
no consolation; nothing is reconciled into ‘sweetness’. Rather, the essential 
unkindness of life is yoked together with the renunciation or acceptance 
demanded by reality. As a symbol of a Weltanschauung, and not merely the 
symbol of a “principle of mental functioning”, necessity is precisely “the 
symbol of disillusion” (Ricoeur, 1970, pp. 327–328). On Freud’s (1915, 
p. 299) reckoning “the first duty of all living beings” consists in “tolerating 
life”, and insofar as “it makes this harder for us”, illusion is seen to have 
little or no value. Thus, in Lear’s case, Freud emphasises the shattering of 
illusion in terms of the old man’s struggle towards the acceptance of reality 
with resignation. 
What does this make Cordelia? Essentially, Freud sees Lear’s daughter – 
indeed, as “the fairest and most desirable” of the three sisters – as a 
representation of death. She appears as such, according to Freud, in a 
twofold disguise – namely, as the object of her father’s so-called free choice 
and, second, as a comparable figure to the Aphrodite of the Judgement of 
Paris, the Goddess of Love, in her role as his “one loyal daughter” (1913, 
p. 298), the only one of his three daughters who really loved him. The detail 
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as well as the method of Freud’s interpretation rests on an analogy in which 
dreams and works of literature are seen as capable of fulfilling wishes in 
fantasised form. Freud (1913, p. 295) ‘transposes’ his interpretation of the 
choice between three sisters from “the language of dreams” to “the mode of 
expression” used in a primaeval myth that Shakespeare reworks in his play. 
Consequently, for Freud the wishful reversal of choice and necessity is 
played out in Shakespeare’s tragedy alongside the reversal of love and death. 
3 
Freud (1913, pp. 294–295) interprets the conjunction of love and silence, in 
its wider mythological context, as a defining characteristic of the ‘excellent 
third’ woman or sister. Moreover, drawing on the symbolism of death in 
Stekel’s Die Sprache des Traumes (1911), he proposes that ‘dumbness’ so 
defined is “a common representation of death”. Having arrived at these basic 
propositions (on the strength of the analogy between dreams and scenes 
from myths and fairy tales), Freud (1913, p. 296) is confident that he knows 
who the three sisters are and why the choice must fall on the third: 
the third one of the sisters between whom the choice is made is . . . 
Death itself, the Goddess of Death . . . the sisters are [therefore] known 
to us. They are the Fates, the Moerae, the Parcae or the Norns [cf. the 
virgin goddesses of fate in Norse mythology], the third of whom is 
called Atropos, the inexorable.  
Lear and Cordelia (father and daughter) are thus bound together, at the very 
heart of the tragedy, through resignation to the inexorable. 
Crucially, the necessity of death is revealed in the guise of Cordelia’s 
“speechless love” (1913, p. 293). In saying what cannot be said, Cordelia 
falls silent. At this point, driven by an analytic imperative aimed at exposing 
our susceptibility to illusion, Freud bases his interpretation on the underlying 
mechanism of wishful substitution. He interprets the silence as a symbol of 
death, where the “fairest and best of women . . . has taken the place of the 
Death-goddess” (1913, p. 300) in the same way that choice stands in place of 
necessity. The two aspects of Freud’s interpretation (i.e. regarding the 
father’s fateful decision and the daughter’s real identity) come together in 
and through the play of illusion-disillusionment. Freud argues that our 
wishes substitute for death its contrary (i.e. love and beauty) in accordance 
with the primaeval identity of life and death in the myth of the Great 
Goddess. The most beautiful woman is seen as the substitute for death, in 
particular, as the figure of death for the aged patriarch who adamantly 
refuses “to renounce the love of women” and, indeed, insists to the extreme 
point of madness “on hearing how much he is loved” (1913, p. 301). 
Freud proposes that the third figure of woman, who comes after both the 
mother and the partner modelled on the pattern of the mother, appears as the 
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figure of Death itself. Under the heading of pitiless realism, the final verdict 
of the Freudian interpretation is unequivocal: “the third of the Fates alone, 
the silent Goddess of Death, will take [us] into her arms” (1913, p. 301). And 
yet Freud leaves a crucial question unanswered here, concerning the 
‘regressive revision’ that he attributes to the primaeval myth of the Death-
goddess – disguised and distorted by wishful illusion. Should this obscurity 
be counted as a lapse? It certainly points to a matter of some psychological 
significance. Does the aged and dying father “renounce love, choose death 
and make friends with the necessity of dying” (1913, p. 301) through 
regression to the primordial figure of the mother? Are we meant to 
understand the figure of Mother Earth in these terms? Is this the figure that 
Lear has to acknowledge, the lesson he has to learn? Is the old man supposed 
to come to terms with reality at the hands of the mother who receives him at 
the end? Are we meant to understand Cordelia as a hard act to follow in 
these terms? 
In one sense, Freud would have us extend the meaning of the ‘common 
mother’ (cf. Timon of Athens, IV. iii. 178) to death itself. Alternatively, his 
interpretation allows for the possibility that the illusion of primary love 
shatters, that the regressive tendency towards imaginary infantile love is 
subject to a violent and transformative disillusioning – precisely, at the point 
where woman becomes the figure of death for man. The ambiguity is left 
unresolved in Freud’s text. There may be no other way of approaching the 
matter, insofar as the absent mother, necessarily disguised, haunts Freud’s 
interpretation no less than the play itself. In any event, Freud (1913, p. 301) 
posits a formidable figure in the guise of Cordelia, where the old man’s wish 
to be loved as he was in his mother’s arms comes to nothing – “Thou’lt 
come no more. / Never, never, never, never, never” (V. iii. 283–284). In the 
name of reality, the Freudian interpretation thus emphasises what King Lear 
records at its most pessimistic – “No, no, no life” (V. iii. 281). Silence is 
seen as a figure of absolute tragedy. 
4 
The Shakespearean discrimination of course isn’t confined to negative 
evaluations and speechless despair. Whether or not Freud opts for tragic 
fatalism is a moot point; the option, however, is definitively ruled out in 
Shakespearean tragedy by the possibility of “a consciousness . . . of 
solemnity in the mystery we cannot fathom” (Bradley, 1905, p. 279). Rowan 
Williams (2016, p. 26) comes to much the same conclusion, regarding the 
reach of the ‘tragic imagination’ and its liturgical setting – it must repeatedly 
show us “what we do not know and cannot know . . . reconnecting us with 
whatever possibility we still possess of building the sacred into our politics”. 
For Williams, as for Bradley, Lear performs the essential work of tragedy, 
classical and modern, as the affirmation of a future (an inner future) beyond 
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the enactment of catastrophic collapse. There is no question that pain 
matters, and matters profoundly, in the evaluation of human life. Freud was 
right about that. But tragedy also provokes us to work through loss and, 
thereby to learn, by means of a decidedly difficult love, what pain does not 
take away from the world. 
Turning to restoration and the reclamation of the sacred, Bradley (1905, 
p. 317) is the canonical source not only for the redemptive King Lear, but 
also for the reading of Cordelia as “a thing enskyed and sainted” (cf. 
Measure for Measure, I. iv. 33). Where does this reading take us? In 
particular, what does it tell us about Cordelia’s capacity for love? 
Shakespeare presents us with a difficulty in the form of a paradox, when it 
comes to Cordelia’s excessive speechlessness. Bradley (1905, p. 316), with 
characteristic critical acumen, suggests ‘paucity of expression’ as both the 
form and function of Cordelia’s speech, which he sees as commensurate with 
the ‘infinite beauty’ of her character. This strikes me as a strong and 
indispensable reading. While she is undoubtedly expressive and fluent as the 
occasion demands; we would, I think, be wrong to approach Cordelia as 
eloquent by nature (Everett, 1989, p. 78). Indeed, I wish to retain the idea of 
restrictive speech as a signifier of unrestricted love. At the same time, I 
should like to suggest something more than a deliberate avoidance of 
‘expansive speech’ on Shakespeare’s part. My argument is that Cordelia 
holds her tongue, beyond both internal and external restrictions, as a positive 
enactment of gratuitous love. 
The conflict of interpretations pivots on the idea of speechlessness – 
indeed, Lear unwittingly homes in with prophetic accuracy on the nature of 
his daughter’s silence, instructing her with foolhardy imperiousness to 
‘mend’ her speech (I. i. 97). How right and wrong the old man is in issuing 
his patriarchal injunction. Alongside his obsessive preoccupation with 
ingratitude, the king proves himself ungracious with his own misplaced talk 
of mending. Reparation is clearly wide of the mark. Cordelia’s silence does 
amount to a kind of broken speech. And yet far from the want of mending, 
her speechlessness stands in its very brokenness as an irreducible 
manifestation of love. She isn’t confined to no more than “a stubborn 
stammering” (Everett, 1989, p. 78). On the contrary, by ‘broken speech’ I 
mean a kind of distress, a speech that is always replete with agony and, in 
keeping with its function as a significant sign, a simultaneously confident 
and vulnerable mode of address. 
The paradox of broken speech is apparent from the opening scene of the 
play, where Cordelia’s symbolic standing is determined by what cannot be 
said. The play effectively takes its bearings from this inaugural manifestation 
of speechlessness. Something breaks out at the beginning, which constitutes 
the beginning itself as an excess, an interruption of the closed system of 
exchange that Lear would have his daughters re-enact in the name of love 
and gratitude. Like Antigone, in this respect at least, Cordelia stands by what 
3 Under the shadow of silence 
exceeds her. As such, she evokes a relation to the law that is no longer or 
primarily tragic. Her announcement of love for nothing exceeds her father’s 
patriarchal embrace; it falls towards or away from the ‘broken middle’ in the 
form – implicit but actual – of what Gillian Rose (1996) called “inaugurated 
mourning”. To put it more simply, Lear reveals the extent to which the work 
of mourning overruns the tragic imagination; not everything in the play 
comes under the heading of ruined love. 
Based on this inaugural enactment of speechlessness, silence subsequently 
assumes both positive and negative value as the central dilemma of Lear – 
indeed, where the worst is yet to come: “And worse I may be yet. The worst 
is not / So long as we can say ‘This is the worst’” (IV. ii. 27–28). The work 
of the negative continues to haunt the action of the drama with its relentless 
emptying and undoing. Accordingly, the action proceeds towards the “dread 
summit” of England’s “chalky bourn” (IV. v. 57), where Gloucester gropes 
in unraised darkness on the threshold of Milton’s “void profound” (Paradise 
Lost, II. 438). The worst – “th’ extreme verge” (IV. v. 26) – remains always 
no more than a step away; negation and cessation are a constant threat, 
alongside the horror of an empty end. 
Nevertheless, the forces of good hold up not only in Cordelia, but also in 
Edgar, Kent, and the Fool. Following Lear’s death, Albany, in a final attempt 
to stay the negative, assigns the order of things to Edgar and Kent. He does 
so in the name of the “gored state” (V. iii. 296) and its future. It turns out that 
Kent has had enough and, in any case, appears to be otherwise obligated – 
by what or to whom isn’t entirely clear. Although of course the king had 
been his raison d’être; more than a feeling for authority, Kent is motivated 
by love of his sovereign: “My life I never held but as a pawn / To wage 
against thine [Lear’s] enemies” (I. i. 155–156). And it is, he tells us at the 
end, his “master” who calls him (V. iii. 298). It is down to Edgar, then, to 
assume the obligation of the future as a burden of “this sad time” (V. ii. 299), 
and we rely on his feel for life – his natural buoyancy and religious soul 
(Bradley, 1905, pp. 306–307) – in taking on this task. 
The watchword for the play, I suggest, is contained in the variously 
defined and contested meanings of ‘not-yet’, or what Ricoeur (1970, p. 551) 
calls “the evocation of possibility”. Consequently, we can compare the 
modern Freudian education to reality with the more expansive reach of the 
Shakespearean imagination. The latter calls for a philosophical frame of 
reference that is adequate not only to what is possible (kata to dynaton), but 
also to what might become possible (dynámei on). What failure doesn’t 
break, what is yet-to-come, is at least as important as the breakdown that 
occurs under the weight of failure and loss. Thus, further to the idea of 
tragedy as resignation to cruel necessity (an idea common to Freud and 
Schopenhauer), the evocation of possibility presupposes a determined use of 
language in which “I leave off all demands and listen” (1970, p. 551). 
Cordelia enacts this way of listening more fully than anyone else in the play. 
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While there is no guarantee of educative consolation, nonetheless, her silent 
witness is attentive to that which is yet-to-come (the inner future), to the 
potentiality as well as the antecedents of “this sad time”. 
The temporal burden of past and present (“this time . . .”), which is 
weighed in the activity of listening under the sign of the future, issues 
essentially from Cordelia’s initial insistence on “Nothing” (I. i. 89). In effect, 
Cordelia appropriates Lear’s ‘nothing’ at its most brutal, the dreadful casting 
off of “paternal care” (I. i. 113) and the reduction of his daughter to non-
existence: “Better thou / Had’st not been born than not t’have pleased me 
better” (V. i. 233–234). Whereas Lear’s destructive love makes ‘nothing’ of 
his daughter; her ‘nothing’ in turn remains integral to her love. Nothingness, 
therefore, isn’t simply privative, but functions in the wider context of the 
play as the condition for the possibility of anticipation. Lear is of course 
immediately impatient with the situation in which he finds himself placed by 
the calling up of nothingness; he demonstrates a passion for not listening: 
“Nothing will come of nothing. Speak again” (I. i. 90). Impatience as an 
obstacle to grace returns, most notably by way of Kafka,2 as among the most 
trenchant themes of modernism. Cordelia, for her part, promises a more 
tolerant, less persecuted attitude towards nothingness which, in the context 
of the play, allows for the future-to-come. 
5 
Cordelia’s attentive, inner stillness is, I suggest, consistent with the 
phenomenon of prayer. Prayer is always a reach beyond merely privative 
silence towards a presence of some kind. As an enactment of inwardness, in 
which one is taught by what cannot be said, listening and keeping silent go 
together with speech. Once again, speechlessness isn’t a figure of “absolute 
tragedy” (Steiner, 1990) or irredeemable negation. This is certainly true of 
Shakespearean tragedy, where speech and silence are never simple 
opposites. The fact is that speech alone can (by the enactment of what 
doesn’t go into words) “transform silence into an act of presence, and not 
into privation” (Chrétien, 2000, p. 160). Cordelia says what she can: “Good 
my lord, / You have begot me, bred me, loved me. / I return those duties 
back as are right fit – / Obey you, love you, and most honour you” (I. i. 95–
98). The repetition of ‘you’ frames a genuine expression of sentiment 
towards paternal authority, even as it places Cordelia in “the Court complex 
of power, love and honour” (Everett, 1989, p. 75). At which point, the 
princess falls silent, leaving ‘nothing’ (as it were) to speak for itself. 
The broken speech of a love unutterable is open to any number of 
readings. I wish to emphasise the religious meaning of this gesture and, 
moreover, to point out that Lear follows his daughter’s example only in 
extremis with his pivotal prayer for “Poor naked wretches” (III. iv. 28). Even 
as his daughter falls silent, Lear prays for the wretched of the earth. This 
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seems to me a viable reading of Cordelia’s silence: continuous with her 
compassionate response to her father’s suffering, her silent witness 
represents an austere and binding expression of loving relatedness. Together, 
witness and response remain a hard act to follow. In stark contrast to the idle 
speech of Lear’s two ungrateful daughters, Cordelia’s prayerful silence 
betokens a gratuitous love. As a mark of respect, adoration and thanksgiving, 
in accordance with the favete linguis (the facilitation of the ritual acts by 
keeping silent), silence appears before the other and for him. How, exactly, 
does this differ from idle speech? Chrétien (2000) describes the interior 
dialogue of prayer, understood as the religious phenomenon par excellence, 
in terms of what he calls “destined speech”. Comparable to my 
understanding of broken speech, he posits the “wounded word” of prayer in 
terms of “a silence before You” – “The silence of prayer is here a silence 
heard by God; it is still and always dialogue, and can be so only because a 
first silence, different and purely privative, was broken” (2000, p. 160). 
Similarly, the audience ‘hears’ Cordelia’s love in the silence. The silence 
of broken speech is a breaking out of itself towards compassionate response, 
what Williams (2916, p. 26) describes as “a showing of the sacred”. 
Compare if you will Iago’s recourse to silence with Cordelia’s broken 
speech: “Demand me nothing. What you know, you know. / From this time 
forth I never will speak word” (V. ii. 309–310). Notwithstanding the 
profusion of unalloyed evil in Lear, indeed, to a greater degree than in any of 
Shakespeare’s other tragedies; Coleridge’s celebrated annotation on Iago’s 
“motiveless malignity” (i.e. the thoroughly ineffable evil of Othello’s 
perverse opponent) denotes a nihilism unsurpassed in Shakespeare. 
Nothingness thus repeats itself ad nauseam in a decidedly privative silence. 
In this case, Lear’s proclamation that nothing will come of nothing proves 
dreadfully accurate, and as such is echoed in Regan’s cruel-hearted 
calculation: “What need one?” (II. ii. 437). The comparison makes the point 
in the most extreme terms: Iago’s solipsistic collapse into nihilism counts 
alongside the hideous brutality of Regan’s destructive narcissism, which 
voids life and has nothing to pass on. 
By contrast, broken speech issues from the call (ekklēsia) of 
prayerfulness, its address to ‘You’ – “whereso’er you are” (III. iv. 28) – is 
inscribed in the ecclesiology of Our Father (Chrétien, 2000, p. 155). To 
underline my main argument, Cordelia’s love is imbued with a transcendent 
meaning by virtue of its gratuitousness. This is certainly an excessive 
gesture, but one that evokes nothingness at the opposite end of the spectrum 
to nihilism. Williams (2007, p. 68) lends weight to this argument by drawing 
attention to the way in which we show God’s love to one another in a 
boundless way – “God never starts being in loving relationship; it’s an 
aspect of what he is eternally”. Cordelia effectively stakes her claim on these 
uncompromising grounds. Together with the broken speech (‘wounded 
word’) of prayerful silence, the traditional Aristotelian distinction between 
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kata to dynaton and dynámei on illuminates the meaning of the inner future 
in Lear. 
None of the survivors achieves a comparable quality of inwardness to 
Cordelia, who, by the end of the play, bestows an essential vitality on the 
ambivalent future as it appears in the gap opened up by Edgar and Albany. 
Lear remains confined to the end by his “monolithic inwardness” (Everett, 
1989, p. 63); whereas Cordelia, beyond Kent’s “promised end” (V. iii. 38), 
confirms the positive evaluation of what is yet to come. The latter is 
bequeathed through the conjunction of love and silence: “What shall 
Cordelia speak? Love and be silent” (I. i. 62). A hard act to follow indeed. 
On this stern reckoning, a silence surrounds us where we live, love and work 
– which presents a daunting prospect from any perspective. 
6 
By holding her tongue, Cordelia exposes her father as morally and 
psychologically immature; but he is also a gullible and soft-hearted old man. 
Lear wishes to be loved even as he loves himself. This doesn’t make him 
corrupt, and nothing leads us to think of him as a base or disgraceful figure. 
Nevertheless, his imperious demand turns on a basic fault and, in hankering 
after his own narcissistic image in the eyes of his daughters, vanity gets the 
better of the old man with disastrous results. Importantly, Lear is in conflict 
with himself before the violent collision with his daughters irrupts and drives 
him mad. He is undone, the calamities and catastrophe ensue, on condition 
that he acts from an inward sense of inconsolability prior to his madness. We 
can speculate about his deep-seated incapacity to mourn; in any case, 
something troubles Lear who, even at his best, is given to “hideous rashness” 
(I. i. 151). This raises an important question. It isn’t clear what order of 
necessity connects inward and outward reality in Lear’s case. We don’t know 
what motivates his fatal decision to divide Britain between two hypocritical 
daughters and, at the same time, to banish Cordelia, his abiding third 
daughter, and faithful Kent. 
Furthermore, we are no clearer to begin with about the direction of the 
play than we are about the motive forces – by the end of the First Act, we 
have yet to discover the consequences of Lear’s actions. In fact, the inner 
conflict (which represents the hero’s tragic character) is revealed, in 
retrospect, by the calamities and complications of the external conflict – 
including, the dramatic doings of Lear’s daughters and Kent (incognito) as 
regards the main plot, and of Gloucester and his two sons regarding the 
secondary plot. The doubling of the action along these lines, at the 
primordial level of what we might call deep family relations, drives home 
the impression of a bleak, irredeemable world. Dramatically speaking, at 
least, the play turns upon the appalling characters of Goneril, Regan and 
Edmund, all of whom are intent on causing harm or doing evil. Lear’s 
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internal reactions, the passions of his tormented soul, continue to unfold in 
relation to those around him whose outward actions signify their monstrous 
cruelty. To be clear, the tragedy rests on Lear’s decision to divide the 
kingdom, and to make the division dependent on public displays of love 
from his three daughters: who loves best gets most. As the action unfolds, 
however, Lear suffers as much as he acts, and his suffering comes about on 
account of enormous cruelty. 
The representation of inner and outer conflict is different in Cordelia’s 
case. Most importantly, unlike Lear she recognises helplessness itself – her 
own and her father’s fallibility – from the standpoint of mature and 
restorative consolation: “O my dear father, restoration hang / Thy medicine 
on my lips, and let this kiss / Repair those violent harms that my two sisters / 
Have in thy reverence made” (IV. vi. 22–25). As a symbol of love rooted in 
kind-heartedness, this singular metaphor of reparation is turned towards her 
father’s tyrannical destructiveness – as well as the depravity of the 
“unnatural hags” (II. ii. 452), Cordial’s two sisters – without the least trace 
of vengeful intent. She is simply more mature and kinder than her father. In 
what seems to me the most decisive of the many reversals that structure 
Shakespeare’s central poetic work, the difficulty of living up to his 
daughter’s exemplum is the existential proof of Lear’s breakdown. He fails 
to see love for what it is, and whether this failure is the consequence or 
condition of his impatience – either way, it is only when he has learnt 
patience (and unlearned hatred) that the old man can take a proper measure 
of his daughter’s maturity. 
In a sense, we are all in the old man’s shoes; we share Lear’s central 
dilemma in having to repeatedly sort out the difference between regressive 
imaginary love (i.e. how one would like to be seen and to see oneself) and 
the symbolic import of mature love. Shakespeare sharpens the distinction 
between the imaginary and symbolic registers by emphasising the 
conjunction of love and silence, or what Freud (1913, p. 293) called 
“speechless love”. As the immediate catalyst of Lear’s catastrophic 
disappointment, his daughter’s unswerving silence takes love beyond the 
reflection of a narcissistic image. Exactly how far ‘beyond’, and in what 
direction, Cordelia’s love extends is my theme in this chapter. Lear is put 
under pressure by his daughter’s steadfast gesture; without degenerating into 
debilitating inhibition or hysterical misery, the young woman’s evocation of 
nothingness haunts the action of the drama from beginning to end. We can 
sympathise with her father’s bewilderment. There is I think something 
almost incomprehensible, an ungraspable excess, in Cornelia’s singular 
tolerance of nothingness. On the basis of a certain “intertwining of the 
human and divine calls” (Chrétien, 2000, p. 164), her response, from 
beginning to end, presupposes a call that continues to reverberate in excess 
of whatever it is thought to mean. 
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The play is framed by Cordelia’s silence as the action moves from her 
“Nothing” at the beginning to her death at the end. To begin with, she admits 
that her love is “More ponderous than [her] tongue” (I. i. 78), that she 
“cannot heave / [Her] heart into [her] mouth” (I. i. 91–92). Announcing her 
love in terms of what cannot be said, she supports her claim to this effect 
with reference to what is right and fit, refusing to say anything more than her 
filial “bond” (I. i. 93) dictates. Together with the mutual ties of blood, the 
symbolic meaning of love is thus acknowledged by means of the rhetorical 
figure of apophasis (i.e. saying something by stating that you will not 
mention it). The young woman knows that she owes herself to her father, 
even in ways she cannot express or that he cannot fathom. She owes him “a 
debt of unreserved attention and love, and an excess of involvement, care, 
disregarding calculation altogether” (Williams, 2016, p. 51). She says as 
much at the point where speech falls silent. And the paradox of silent witness 
deepens with her death. The sudden entrance of Lear, with his daughter’s 
dead body in his arms, leaves us at a loss on so many levels, faced with what 
Freud (1913, p. 301) described as “one of the culminating points of tragedy 
in modern drama”. No matter how often one has seen or read the play, this 
harrowing image remains thoroughly shocking. The old man dies in turn 
and, seemingly in a state of joy, commands the onlookers to “Look on her. 
Look, her lips. / Look there, look there” (V. iii. 286–287). 
What are we supposed to be looking at? Opposing worldviews come 
sharply into focus here. Does the old man believe his daughter is still alive? 
Are we meant to read apprehensions of hope in his command? Or is this a 
last defence against blank pain? It is worth pursuing Freud’s interpretation a 
little further. Lear is a play about paternal hubris as much as filial 
ingratitude, in which Gloucester’s torment on muddling good and evil 
(Edgar and Edmund) mirrors Lear’s suffering as a consequence of his own 
misguided judgement. At the same time, it stages the father’s death as 
resignation to necessity. In following the action of the drama (Lear’s belated 
realisation of Cornelia’s irrefutable love), we find ourselves witness to the 
inner workings of a seemingly inexorable order of reality. Lear is purged, but 
dies enfeebled nonetheless; similarly, Gloucester is blinded in a grotesque 
display of brutality that cannot be undone. Adversity, at this level of 
extremity, seems irredeemable. The Freudian interpretation proves itself on 
the grounds that catastrophe marks the terminus ad quem of Shakespearean 
tragedy. Kent thus pronounces, in an appropriately solemn tone, on the old 
man’s departing spirit – “let him pass. He hates him / That would upon the 
rack of this tough world / Stretch him out longer” (V. iii. 289–291). In Kent’s 
thoroughly trustworthy estimation, the end requires only as much time as it 
takes for the ruined sovereign to be gone. There is no call for an aftermath, 
no reprise, nothing to reclaim in compensation. 
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And yet if we allow for the “unbearable joy” (Bradley, 1905, p. 291) of 
Lear’s last speech (as I think we should), this creates a very different 
impression of the old man. We see him now illuminated in his daughter’s 
radiance. This isn’t a sign of madness. Lear is finally drawn towards 
Cordelia’s evocation of nothingness. Once again, I don’t mean to say that 
things end happily. The play turns out to be immensely sad. Nevertheless, we 
do, I believe, feel somehow enlivened at the end, or as Bradley (1905, 
p. 292) puts it, that “everything external has become nothing to [Lear], and 
that what remains is ‘the thing itself’, the soul in its bare greatness”. One 
need not necessarily draw an analogy here to the narrative of Christian 
redemption, but the humiliation that issues from the very ignobility of 
Cordelia’s death by hanging is lifted up through a combined sense of joy and 
bare humanity. As he lays his daughter’s body down, the mention of her 
“breath” (V. iii. 237) allows for the possibility of a vital link beyond the old 
man’s delusions. In the humane vision of the tragic imagination, the breath 
of life anticipates the future to come. This is how I read the end of the play: 
Cordelia has managed to turn her father’s “offices of nature” and “dues of 
gratitude” (II. ii. 351–352) profoundly inward, embodying the silence 
without reserve in a religious atmosphere of spiritual grace. 
This suggests a very different kind of boundary concerning the father–
daughter relationship in conjunction with ‘the mystery of resurrection’ 
(Josipovici, 2016, p. 119) and the restoration of love. Lear thus announces 
and inaugurates a preoccupation that marks Shakespeare’s final period, the 
period of Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter’s Tale, and The Tempest. As we 
have seen, there is an aspect of prayerfulness in Cordelia’s falling silent to 
begin with, a quality which extends its reach through her compassionate 
response to her father’s suffering – “For thee, oppressed King, I am cast 
down, / Myself could else outfrown false fortune’s frown” (V. iii. 5–6) – to 
the symbol of her death at the end of the play. In this respect, Shakespeare 
presents us with a character who, in the profound continuity of her witness 
and response, calls for something more restorative than the Freudian 
dispossession of consciousness. At once silent and compassionate, Cordelia 
lights the path of bare humanity that Lear painfully works his way towards 
throughout the course of the play. Shakespeare, in other words, presents us 
with someone whose capacity for love reaches her father in a final agony of 
ecstasy, and who may yet open “the door to a future even when we can see 
no hope” (Williams, 2007, p. 44). 
In conclusion, the Freudian interpretation of the Death-goddess gets us 
only so far in our appreciation of Lear. Further to the critique of illusion, a 
vital belief in the world announces itself in a love that falls silent to begin 
with. What cannot be said, in this case, speaks of our situation in the sacred. 
No less daunting than Lear’s “O without a figure” (I. iv. 174–175), 
Cordelia’s transcendent rendering of “Nothing” (I. i. 89) goes beyond words 
(she stands by what cannot be said), but also beyond the eloquence of 
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silence. She cannot, nor would she wish to, put words to her father’s worldly 
demand for repayment, a return for his generosity towards her and her two 
sisters. And yet for all that, I don’t think Shakespeare means to turn silence 
into a rhetorical ploy. Cordelia doesn’t credit Lear’s notion of gratitude, even 
while he remains insanely blind to hers. Averse to considerations of 
reciprocity or repayment, in matters of the ‘heart’ at least (I. i. 104), the child 
embodies a deeper sense of grace, and a more profound understanding of 
kindness than her father is able to reach in his person. In this respect, far 
from a type of persuasive speech, her broken restrictive speech interrupts the 
exchange of gifts. Cordelia thus defers the catastrophic collapse of meaning 
that is otherwise all-pervasive in this darkest of Shakespeare’s poems. 
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1 Quotations from Shakespeare in this chapter are based upon the edition of Stanley 
Wells and Gary Taylor (1987); and I refer throughout to its numeration of acts, 
scenes and lines. 
2 See Chapter 10 of this book. 
